NISA: Node Identification and Spoofing Attack Detection Based on Clock Features and Radio Information for Wireless Sensor Networks by Huan, Xintao et al.
1
NISA: Node Identification and Spoofing Attack Detection Based on
Clock Features and Radio Information for Wireless Sensor Networks
Xintao Huan, Student Member, IEEE, Kyeong Soo Kim, Senior Member, IEEE, and Junqing Zhang
Abstract—Node identification based on unique hardware fea-
tures like clock skews has been considered an efficient technique
in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). Spoofing attacks imitating
unique hardware features, however, could significantly impair or
break down conventional clock-skew-based node identification
due to exposed clock information through broadcasting. To
defend against Spoofing attacks, we propose a new node identi-
fication scheme called node identification against Spoofing attack
(NISA). It utilizes the reverse time synchronization framework,
where sensor nodes’ clock skews are estimated at the head of
a WSN, and the spatially-correlated radio link information to
achieve simultaneous node identification and attack detection. We
further provide centralized and distributed NISA for covering
both single-hop and multi-hop scenarios, the former of which
employs a single-input and multiple-output convolutional neural
network. With a real WSN testbed consisting of TelosB sensor
nodes running TinyOS, we investigate the identifiability of clock
skews under temperature and voltage variations and evaluate
the performance of both centralized and distributed NISA.
Experimental results demonstrate that both centralized and
distributed NISA could provide accurate node identification and
Spoofing attack detection.
Index Terms—Node identification, Spoofing attack, clock skew,
received signal strength, link quality indicator, wireless sensor
network, convolutional neural network.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE thriving technologies of wireless communications andnetworking expedite the reliance of our daily lives on
smart devices such as laptops, smartphones, and nowadays
Internet of Things (IoT) devices [1]. The security of those
devices, therefore, becomes a serious concern. An efficient
security measure for wireless networks is node identifica-
tion, i.e., the identification of legitimate devices often in
the presence of attackers. Conventional techniques based on
pre-defined identifiers (IDs) or media access control (MAC)
addresses have been widely used for node identification.
Malicious devices, however, could impersonate legitimate ones
so that attackers join a network, intercept data exchanged,
and even launch attacks—like denial of service (DoS)—on
the network [2], [3].
Device fingerprinting (DF) techniques utilizing hardware
features as device-specific fingerprints are considered a
promising technique that could alleviate the vulnerability of
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the conventional node identification techniques [4]. Of many
hardware features, radio frequency (RF) and clock features—
i.e., related with wireless modules and crystal oscillators
(COs) of devices, respectively—attract much attention for
a variety of application scenarios from wireless local area
networks (WLANs) [5] to cloud [6] and controller area
networks (CANs) [7] to IoT [8]. The RF features, however,
often require additional equipment [8]—e.g., universal
software radio peripheral (USRP)—for their measurement, so
they couldn’t be employed in normal gateway nodes (also
called cluster heads) in multi-hop wireless networks. The
clock features such as clock skews, on the other hand, are
readily available as part of the time synchronization service
for wireless communication and networking. Therefore,
clock-skew-based node identification (CSNI) becomes an
attractive option, especially for large-scale, multi-hop wireless
sensor networks (WSNs).
In the literature, clock skews as device-specific fingerprints
could be estimated by various methods from simple ratio-
based one [9] to complex linear regression [10], and node
identification could be achieved through simple thresholding
[11] to advanced machine learning (ML) techniques [8], [12].
Depending on the location of clock skew estimation and node
identification, CSNI schemes can be categorized as centralized
(i.e., at the head1) or distributed (i.e., at gateway and/or
sensor nodes) ones. In [11], a preliminary investigation of
differentiating sensor nodes based on clock skews was studied
using the flooding time synchronization protocol (FTSP) [13]
as a skew estimator; sensor nodes locally estimate their clock
skews and transmit them back to the head for centralized node
identification by employing a simple thresholding method. In
[14], the authors experimentally verified that different sensor
nodes—i.e., MICAz [15] and TelosB [16]—have different and
unique clock skews, which can be easily distinguished at
a centralized monitoring station even in a multi-hop WSN.
They also identified and discussed the issue of exposing the
estimated clock skews through a non-covert channel from the
security perspective; the transmission of clock skews over the
network as in [11] is vulnerable to security attack [14]. The
utilization of CSNI for defending some common attacks such
as Sybil [17], Replication [18], and Wormhole [19] has also
been studied: The combination of the continuity of clock skews
and node IDs can be used to detect Sybil and Replication
attacks [11], while the immutable characteristics of clock
skews can be employed to defend Wormhole and Sybil attacks
[20].
However, CSNI fails when malicious nodes can imitate the
1A head is typically an ensemble of a head/sink node and a monitoring
station such as a PC or a server connected to it.
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clock skews of legitimate ones to the point that fake and true
clock skews cannot be differentiated from one another, which
we call Spoofing attack2 throughout the paper. The Spoofing
attacker described in [22] could pretend itself as a legitimate
sensor node by estimating the clock skew and offset based on
the timestamps intercepted from the legitimate sensor node. To
defend CSNI against Spoofing attack, therefore, we propose an
approach called Node Identification against Spoofing Attack
(NISA) based on the reverse asymmetric time synchronization
framework [10], [23], [24]. Through unilaterally collecting
the spatially-correlated radio information of received signal
strength (RSS) and link quality indicator (LQI)3 together
with clock features extracted from the reverse time synchro-
nization, NISA could simultaneously detect Spoofing attacks
and achieve node identification. Note that radio information
such as RSS is available as part of the transmission services
for wireless communication and networking, which does not
require additional equipment for its measurement; the spatial
correlation of radio information has been widely employed
for various applications such as indoor localization [25], [26],
key generation [27], and attack detection and localization
[28], [29]. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is
the first CSNI scheme simultaneously addressing the node
identification and spoofing attack detection for both single-
hop and multi-hop WSNs.
Our major contributions in this paper are summarized as
follows:
• We propose centralized NISA that lays its foundation
on BATS—i.e., the state-of-the-art reverse asymmetric
time synchronization scheme—which can significantly
improve the secrecy and identifiability of sensor nodes’
clock skews. A single-input and multiple-output (SIMO)
convolutional neural network (CNN) is employed in cen-
tralized NISA for simultaneous node identification and
attack detection by taking the time series of clock features
and radio information as its input.
• We also propose distributed NISA which can run at
normal gateway nodes cover multi-hop scenarios, which
most conventional RF fingerprint-based identification
schemes [8], [30], [31] couldn’t be applied to. As node
identification and attack detection are done locally
at gateway nodes in distributed NISA without the
involvement of the head, it could immediately filter
out attacks nearby and remove unnecessary packet
transmissions upstream from the gateways to the head.
• We carry out a systematic investigation of the identifia-
bility of sensor nodes’ clock skews based on the high-
precision centralized NISA. Unlike the existing inves-
tigations [32], [33], ours demonstrates the concurrent
behaviors of the clock skews of a group of sensor nodes
under temperature and voltage variations, which result
from the drifts of digitally-controlled oscillators (DCOs)
calibrated by COs.
• We present the design, implementation, and practical
2This attack is also called clock skew replication attack in [21].
3LQI is a vendor-specific value which is currently available in IEEE
802.15.4 standard.
evaluation of the performance of both centralized and
distributed NISA on a real WSN testbed consisting of
TelosB [16] sensor nodes running TinyOS [34]. Ex-
perimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of both
centralized and distributed NISA in node identification
while defending against Spoofing attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The overview
of NISA is provided in Section II. The centralized and
distributed realizations of NISA are presented in Sections III
and IV. Our investigations on clock skews and experimental
evaluation of the performance of both centralized and dis-
tributed NISA are discussed in Section V. Section VI reviews
the related work in comparison to ours. Concluding remarks
with future work are given in Section VII.
II. NISA: NODE IDENTIFICATION AND SPOOFING ATTACK
DETECTION BASED ON CLOCK FEATURES AND RADIO
INFORMATION
In this section, we first discuss the acquisition of the clock
features for node identification and the characteristics of radio
information for spoofing attack detection. Based on these
foundations, then we provide an overview of the proposed
NISA system.
A. Clock Features for Node Identification
Clock skew and offset represent the fundamental relation-
ship between two hardware clocks in time synchronization.
The accurate estimation and update of them are essential not
only for high synchronization accuracy but also for reliable
node identification based on the uniqueness of hardware
clocks. Due to the imperfect manufacturing of the low-cost
COs in common WSN devices, the clock frequencies of any
two sensor nodes are hardly identical to each other [14]. Hence
a different and unique clock frequency specific to each sensor
node.
As a clock skew is one of the two parameters in modeling
the relationship between the hardware clocks in the first-order
affine hardware clock model that most time synchronization
schemes rely on (e.g., [24], [35]), the clock skew between
the hardware clock Ti of a sensor node i and the reference
clock t of the head node can be defined as follows: For
i∈ [0, 1, . . . , N−1],




where N denotes the number of sensor nodes, εi∈R and θi∈R
respectively represent the clock skew and offset between the
sensor node i’s hardware clock and the reference clock.
For convenience, we often use clock frequency ratio Ri—
also called slope—instead of the clock skew εi , which is given
by:




The clock frequency ratio is calculated based on the clock
time acquired from the internal DCO calibrated by the external
CO, which represents the behaviors of both internal DCO and
external CO. Note that, since DCO has up to ten times larger
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ppm than CO [36], our investigation is conceptually different
from those based only on external CO as in [32], [33].
The clock offset θi , also called intercept, represents the
hardware clock at t=0 (i.e., Ti(0)). Unlike clock skew, it
cannot be used as a device-specific fingerprint because its
value does not depend on hardware features and changes
whenever power cycling any of the two nodes. During the
normal operation, however, its value is fixed & likely unique
and rather stable for a short period of time, so it can be used as
an auxiliary variable for CSNI, especially when fine-grained
node identification is needed in large-scale WSNs as we will
discuss in Section III.
The clock parameters are estimated based on the linear
regression in BATS [10]: During the kth synchronization
(k≥m), the clock parameters of the sensor node i are estimated












t(k) = [tk−m+1, . . . , tk] ,
Ti(k) = [Ti(tk−m+1), . . . ,Ti(tk)] ,
and R̂i(k) and θ̂i(k) are the clock parameters of frequency ratio
and offset, (·)> and (·)−1 denote vector transpose and matrix
inverse, respectively. Note that the estimation of clock skew
can be obtained from R̂i(k), i.e., ε̂i(k)=R̂i(k)−1.
It is worthwhile to mention the advantages of the clock
parameter estimation of BATS when applied to CSNI. First,
the reverse one-way time synchronization framework of BATS
estimates the clock parameters of sensor nodes at the head and,
thereby, does not expose estimated clock skews to other nodes
in the network unlike conventional schemes where the clock
skews estimated at sensor nodes have to be transmitted back to
the head for node identification. Second, the sliding window
size of the linear regression (i.e., m) can be adjusted for the
operation environment of a WSN; a larger window size can im-
prove the accuracy of the estimation for a static environment,
while a smaller one can adapt to a dynamic environment more
quickly at the expense of the estimation accuracy. Third, the
high-precision estimation of clock parameters based on 64-bit
double-precision floating-point at the head—providing up to
16 significant digits after a decimal point [37]—enables finer-
grained CSNI which is critical for large-scale WSNs [14].
B. Radio Information for Spoofing Attack Detection
There are existing measures for CSNI against the Spoofing
attack such as actively altering the synchronization interval
[21]. In contrast to those measures, we novelly adopt the
radio information in defending against Spoofing attacks, which
could be passively measured to be consistent with the passive
nature of the CSNI method.
Radio information such as RSS and LQI from a received
packet indicates the signal strength and the quality of packet
transmission. Specifically, RSS is correlated in space and,
therefore, varies with location, which has been well exploited
in many techniques such as indoor localization and key gener-
ation. For instance, the spatial variation of the RSS has been
extensively studied in the key generation [27], [38], where
they revealed that an attacker located more than one half-
wavelength away from any existing legitimate device faces
uncorrelated multipath fading in most scenarios. Note that RSS
is not the instantaneous power of the received signal, which
is not available at typical receivers, but its time average. In
common WSN platforms, the average power of the received
signal is referred to as the received signal strength indicator
(RSSI).
LQI is another parameter on the radio information. In
[39], it is suggested that LQI should be employed as an
indicator for intermediate quality links after averaging over
multiple readings due to its high variance over time; time-
averaged LQI could be a better indicator for packet receive
ratio (PRR) than RSSI. In contrast, when the link quality
is good whereby the LQI is insensitive, RSSI could be a
better indicator for distinguishing attackers. Note that LQI is
platform-specific; LQI is highly correlated in space and can be
used for key generation like RSS on some platforms [40] but
not on other platforms. As such, LQI at least could be used for
node identification for distinguishing attackers from legitimate
devices when intermediate quality links are available [39].
Because the ensemble of RSSI and LQI is less sensitive to
instantaneous link fluctuations, it can better represent the link
status [41].
Note that, due to its spatial correlation, radio information is
hard to be impersonated by attackers and, thereby, could com-
plement clock features which are vulnerable to the Spoofing
attack. In the following, we provide an overview of NISA
which leverages both radio information and clock features to
reinforce CSNI against Spoofing attacks.
C. Overview of NISA System
Two distinctive aspects of our design of NISA systems are
a covert channel [14] and passive nature. For the former, the
transmission of estimated clock features and radio information
over a network, which is vulnerable to eavesdropping, cannot
be allowed; for the latter, the system should be able to perform
node identification and attack detection without the modifica-
tion of standard procedures requiring the active involvement
of sensor nodes like the frequent changes of synchronization
time period suggested in [21]. For these reasons, we found that
BATS, i.e., the reverse one-way time synchronization scheme
whose estimations of clock features are all done at the head, is
a perfect candidate for CSNI part of NISA; unlike conventional
CSNI schemes relying on transmissions of clock features from
sensor nodes to the head (or gateway nodes in the case of
multi-hop WSNs) for node identification (e.g., [11]), BATS
enables the clock features to be estimated and used for node
identification at the same place (i.e., the head or gateway
nodes) without exposing it over a network. Likewise, the head
or gateway nodes can directly measure the spatially-correlated
radio information for attack detection without exposing it over
a network. Therefore, NISA could passively achieve node














































Fig. 2. NISA system designs: (a) Centralized NISA for single-hop WSNs;
(b) distributed NISA for multi-hop WSNs.
In Fig. 1, we provide an overview of the proposed NISA
system. When the packets from sensor nodes arrive, the head
extracts the clock features—i.e., skew and offset—using the
reverse time synchronization and measures the radio informa-
tion of RSSI and LQI. Then a database is constructed based
on them for node identification and attack detection later.
However, as WSNs often require multi-hop configurations to
cover vast areas, we provide two variations in NISA system
design, namely centralized NISA and distributed NISA, for
respectively addressing single-hop and multi-hop scenarios.
As illustrated in Fig. 2 (a), the node identification and attack
detection are done at the head consisting of a head node
and a powerful monitoring station in centralized NISA, which
makes it possible to employ advanced techniques for better
performance. Because it would be impractical to implement
a rather heavy centralized NISA system at gateway nodes,
however, we propose distributed NISA in order to cover multi-
hop scenarios as shown in Fig. 2 (b). Note that the system
design is intentionally simplified in this case so that it can
be easily implemented at gateway nodes that are often normal
battery-powered sensor nodes.
The two system designs provide different options in perfor-
mance and computational complexity tradeoff: Simple classi-
fication or thresholding schemes could suffice for distributed
NISA but at the expense of relatively lower performance,
which we discuss in Section V. Centralized NISA, on the other
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Fig. 3. Workflow of centralized NISA.
classification/detection methods like those based on neural
networks [8], which can take all parameters into account and
run node identification and attack detection in an integrated
manner, at the expense of computational complexity.
III. CENTRALIZED NISA
As we discussed in Section II-C, centralized NISA is
designed to provide better performance based on the integrated
processing of clock features and radio information for single-
hop WSNs. Here we provide more details of centralized NISA,
including its workflow and implementation example.
A. Workflow of Centralized NISA
As shown in Fig. 3, there are two phases in the work-
flow of centralized NISA, i.e., the initial phase and de-
tection/identification phase. From the packets received from
sensor nodes, centralized NISA extracts clock features through
time synchronization and collects radio information during the
initial phase. The clock features and the radio information
are then combined and fed into a database. After gathering
enough data for all the sensor nodes in the network, a training
process is performed based on the database for classification.
The system switches to the detection/identification phase when
the training process is completed.
During the detection/identification phase, a common func-
tional block—i.e., the “Multi-Output Classifier” shown in
Fig. 3—carries out both node identification and attack de-
tection simultaneously. When an attack is detected, the cor-
responding packet is dropped; otherwise, the identified node
ID is reported as a final result of CSNI. This group of data—
i.e., a node ID and its corresponding clock features and radio
information—is used to continuously update the database.
The major challenge in the workflow of centralized NISA
is the implementation of the common functional block that
should be able to process the clock features and the radio
information as a whole for simultaneous node identification
and attack detection through time-series classification (TSC);
solutions based on advanced neural networks like CNN,
recurrent neural network (RNN), and their many variations
(e.g., long short-term memory (LSTM) and gated recurrent
unit (GRU)) could be employed for TSC. Among them,
CNN is rather popular for node identification (i.e., device









































Fig. 4. SIMO CNN architecture employed as the multi-output classifier of
centralized NISA.
nodes’ fingerprints as image data [8], [42] but also solving
the TSC problem as demonstrated in [43] and [44], which is
why we choose it for our sample implementation described in
the next subsection.
B. Implementation of Centralized NISA Based on SIMO CNN
Here we provide the details of our sample implementation
of centralized NISA based on SIMO CNN. As discussed in
Section II-A, BATS—the reverse one-way time synchroniza-
tion scheme—is used for time synchronization and CSNI due
to its capability of providing fine-grained identifiability of
clock skews and offsets. At sensor nodes, no processes are
running for NISA except MAC-layer timestamping required
by BATS for achieving time synchronization. At the head
node, it measures RSSI and LQI of each received packet
and forwards them—together with the associated timestamps
from MAC-layer timestamping—to a monitoring station which
not only estimates clock skew and offset based on BATS but
also performs NISA based on SIMO CNN. The details of the
procedures at the head node for centralized NISA are given in
the pseudocode in Appendix A.
Fig. 4 shows the architecture of SIMO CNN working as
the multi-output classifier in the implementation of centralized
NISA. The input layer of SIMO CNN takes time series of
combined clock features and radio information—i.e., clock
skew, clock offset, RSSI, and LQI—as its input. Convolutional
layers 1 & 2 connecting the input layer are followed by a
max pooling layer preventing overfitting, convolutional layers
3 & 4, and a global average pooling layer again preventing
overfitting by using the average value. The output from the
global average pooling layer goes through a dropout layer
with dropout rate of 0.5, which is connected to output layers
1 and 2. All the convolutional layers use the rectified linear
unit (ReLu) as their activation function. The output layer 1 for
node identification uses softmax as its activation function for
multiclass classification, while the output layer 2 for attack
detection uses sigmoid as its activation function for binary
classification. We use ADAM optimizer [45] for training and
loss functions of categorical cross-entropy and binary cross-
entropy for multi-class classification (node identification) and
binary classification (attack detection). The batch size and the
number of epochs are set to 10 and 100, respectively.
The proposed SIMO CNN is implemented in Python with
Keras [46] and TensorFlow [47]. The subsystems at the head
and the sensor nodes are implemented in nesC on TinyOS, and
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Fig. 5. Workflow of distributed NISA.
IV. DISTRIBUTED NISA
Centralized NISA can provide better performance based
on the integrated processing of clock features and radio
information, but it would be impractical to implement a
rather heavy centralized NISA system at gateway nodes in
multi-hop WSNs. To support multi-hop WSNs, therefore, we
separate the processing of node identification and that of attack
detection in the design of distributed NISA, which not only
lowers the computational complexity but also enables further
simplification of each of the processing. In this section, we
discuss the details of the workflow and the implementation of
distributed NISA.
A. Workflow of Distributed NISA
Fig. 5 shows the workflow of distributed NISA. Using the
packets received from sensor nodes, distributed NISA extracts
clock features through time synchronization and collects radio
information during the initial phase. Unlike centralized NISA,
however, the clock features and the radio information are used
separately for building a clock database for node identification
and a radio database for attack detection, respectively.
During the detection/identification phase, the clock features
are fed into a classifier for node identification, which operates
on the built clock database consisting of pairs of node ID and
clock features. The classifier could be implemented based on
a simple thresholding method with upper and lower bounds
for a clock skew [11] or a relatively complex classification
algorithm like k-nearest neighbors (KNN) [48]. If the node
identification is successful, the resulting node ID is used in
further processing of attack detection; otherwise, the received
packet is dropped.
Then, the radio information, together with the node ID,
is provided as an input to the attack detection block, where
potential Spoofing attacks are detected based on the node ID
by comparing the received radio information with that already
in the radio database; multiple data points are used for the
processing in order to mitigate the effects of instantaneous
fluctuations in the radio information like RSSI. It turns out
that the anomaly detection based on RSSI with methods like
thresholding is a well-studied problem [49]; there are various
thresholding solutions with different complexities. Finally, if
a Spoofing attack is detected, the received packet is dropped;
otherwise, distributed NISA returns the node ID as a final
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result and updates the databases based on the new legitimate
data samples.
B. Implementation of Distributed NISA at Gateway Nodes
Based on the above workflow, we implement distributed
NISA on gateway nodes which are ordinary sensor nodes in
this work as discussed in Section I; our implementation of
distributed NISA on an ordinary sensor node as a gateway
node could demonstrate its practicality for multi-hop scenarios.
For time synchronization, we implement a simplified ver-
sion of BATS based on simple linear regression for the
estimation of clock parameters as in [13], which is also used
for extracting clock features. We apply the reverse one-way
synchronization framework of BATS to the time synchroniza-
tion between a gateway node and its offspring sensor nodes
in a multi-hop WSN, which was originally proposed for the
time synchronization between the head and sensor nodes in
a single-hop WSN [10]. For node identification, we compare
the clock skew of a received packet with the average clock
skews of legitimate nodes in the database and find the ID of
a legitimate node that matches best; during the comparison,
we use a threshold-based prefiltering of the clock skew from
a fake node as suggested in [11]. We use a similar approach
for attack detection using RSSI for comparison.
Note that the gateway nodes in distributed NISA can decide
whether to accept or drop received packets based on the results
of node identification and attack detection locally without
transmitting the clock skews and the radio information for
the processing at the head, which prevents attackers from
eavesdropping them.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present the experimental results for
the investigation on the identifiability of clock skews under
various operating conditions and the performance evaluation
of centralized and distributed NISA with single-hop and multi-
hop WSNs.
A. Experimental Setup
Unlike conventional node identification schemes (e.g., [8]),
the proposed NISA can be implemented and evaluated on a
common WSN testbed without special hardware like USRP or
modification of the existing infrastructure. The WSN testbed
for our investigation of clock skews and evaluation of the
performance of NISA systems, therefore, consists of ordinary
head, gateway, and sensor nodes, all of which are based
on TelosB motes running TinyOS. We use a single-hop star
topology with 1 head and 10 sensor nodes for the investi-
gation on clock skews & the evaluations of the performance
of centralized NISA and a multi-hop tree topology with 1
head, 2 gateway, and 6 sensor nodes for the evaluation of
the performance of distributed NISA, which are shown in
Fig. 6 (a) and (b), respectively.
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Fig. 6. Network topologies for (a) a single-hop WSN and (b) a multi-hop
WSN.
B. Investigation on Clock Skew Identifiability
We carry out a series of experiments with the single-hop
WSN shown in Fig. 6 (a) to investigate the fine-grained
identifiability of clock skews provided by BATS under various
operating environments, where we set the time synchronization
interval and the sliding window size to 1 s and 19, respectively,
as in [10].
1) Under Fixed Temperature and Voltage: We recorded the
clock skews of each sensor node with respect to the head
node for an hour in a controlled environment where the effect
of temperature and voltage variations on the clock skews can
be ignored. Fig. 7 (a) shows the clock frequency ratios of
10 sensor nodes, where we can observe that the frequency
ratios of the sensor nodes are quite stable for the whole period
and that most frequency ratios are distinguishable even in the
low-precision view except those of sensor nodes 1 & 8 and
3 & 6. Thanks to the high-precision estimation of the clock
parameters of BATS, we can zoom in those indistinguishable
frequency ratios with higher precision as shown in Fig. 7 (b)
and (c), which reveals that they can be clearly identified, too.
2) Under Temperature and Voltage Variations: It has been
demonstrated by many (e.g., [14], [32], [33]) that hardware
clocks, unless equipped with compensation circuits, are af-
fected by temperature and voltage variations, resulting in time-
varying clock skews; this is the case for the hardware clocks
of most WSN devices, which are based on low-cost COs [33].
However, the concurrent behaviors of the clock skews of a
group of sensor nodes resulting from the drifts of both DCOs
and COs under temperature and voltage variations are yet
to be investigated, which, in fact, is the main focus of the
experiments described in this subsection.
According to the empirical study in [32], the effect of
temperature and voltage variations on the clock skew could
be modeled as a linear function for a period of time during
which the amount of changes in temperature and voltage is
rather small: Given the initial time t0, the skew for t>t0 is
given by
εi(t) = εi(t0) + ∆εi(t0, t), (4)
∆εi(t0, t) = α(t)(T (t) − T (t0)) + β(t)(V(t) − V(t0)), (5)
where ∆εi(t0, t) is the difference of the skew value between
time t0 and t, T(t) and V(t) are the temperature and the
voltage at time t, and α(t) and β(t) are the temperature-
skew sensitivity factor and the voltage-skew sensitivity factor
at time t; the sensitivity factors are to be estimated through
7
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Fig. 7. Estimated clock frequency ratios of (a) all 10 sensor nodes and
zoomed-in (b) sensor nodes 1 & 8 and (c) sensor nodes 3 & 6 over 3600 s.
experiments. Alternatively, we could feed as input data the
time series of timestamps, temperatures, and voltages into a
neural network so that it can learn the complex relationship
between the clock skew and those environment variables [50].
Instead of directly modeling the effect of temperature and
voltage variations on the clock skew, we could adjust the slid-
ing window size mentioned in Section V-B so that the periodic
updates of the clock skew reflect the effect, which is practical
for finding the current clock skew under a dynamic environ-
ment and also sufficient for the purpose of node identification.
Based on this, we experimentally investigate the identifiability
of the clock skews under voltage and temperature variations
in the following experiments.
We use the onboard temperature sensor to read the envi-
ronment temperature which reduces gradually from 32 ◦C to
the turn-over temperature 25 ◦C. We equip each sensor node
with two AA batteries as in actual deployments and use the
onboard voltage sensor to measure the voltage level. Since not
all the batteries are brand new, their starting voltages are quite
different from one another, which enables us to investigate the
clock skew behavior under the same temperature change but
different voltage levels. During the experiments, we observe
































Fig. 8. Clock frequency ratio of sensor node 10 under temperature and voltage
variations over 3600 s.
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Fig. 9. Clock frequency ratios of sensor nodes under temperature variations
over 3600 s: (a) Sensor nodes 3 & 6, (b) sensor node 9, (c) sensor nodes 1
& 8, (d) sensor node 7, (e) sensor node 2, (f) sensor node 4, (g) sensor node
5, and (h) sensor node 10.
0.05 V decrease per each node during the 1-hour period.
Fig. 8 shows as an example the changes in the clock skew
of sensor node 10 under temperature and voltage variations,
where the range of the voltage level (0.05 V) is much smaller
compared to that of the temperature (7 ◦C) as mentioned. The
ranges of temperature and voltage variations in this experiment
are typical for actual deployments where the batteries live for
months and the temperature changes day and night.
Fig. 9 summarizes the effect of temperature variation on
the clock skews of all 10 sensor nodes over 3600 s, where the
left and right y-axes denote the clock frequency ratio and the
8
environment temperature, respectively.
Note that, though the starting voltage levels of all sensor
nodes are different, their consumptions during the experiment
are little and similar to one another, whose effect on the clock
skews of all sensor nodes are relatively smaller compared to
that of the temperature. Specifically, all the variations of the
clock frequency ratios shown in Fig. 9 follow the similar trend
of the varying temperature; Fig. 9 (a) and (c) in particular
show that, though the clock frequency ratios of the sensor
nodes are different, their changes are quite similar to each
other in terms of both trend and the amount of changes. These
results demonstrate that the clock skews of sensor nodes are
still distinguishable as far as they are deployed under the same
environment, which is of critical importance to CSNI.
C. Performance of Centralized NISA under Single-Hop Sce-
narios
We evaluate the performance of centralized NISA in a
single-hop WSN shown in Fig. 6 (a), where each sensor
node sends its packet to the head node every second as in
[10]. We collect 1,000 and 500 packets for each sensor node
respectively for training and validation on the first day, and
another 1,000 packets for testing on the second day. Since
there is no existing CSNI scheme carrying out simultaneous
node identification and spoofing attack detection for WSNs,
we put the focus of our evaluation on the effectiveness of the
proposed centralized NISA as such using node identification
accuracy and attack detection rate as performance measures.
We carry out the performance evaluation in two steps: First,
we focus on the effectiveness of the node identification without
Spoofing attacks. Second, we evaluate the effectiveness of the
attack detection under Spoofing attacks.
1) Without Spoofing Attacks: As discussed in Section III,
the measurements from 10 consecutive packets are formed into
time series in order to handle the variations of clock skew
and offset and the fluctuations of RSS and LQI, resulting in
100 testing time series for each sensor node. Another crucial
step towards TSC is the scaling of the datasets—we transform
the value of our data into the range of [0, 1], which is of
importance for the classifier to achieve satisfactory results.
We trained the SIMO CNN of the system based on the
training dataset, tuned its hyperparameters based on the vali-
dation dataset, and finally evaluated the performance of node
identification based on the test dataset, whose confusion matrix
is shown in Fig. 10. Labels 0 to 9 stand for sensor node
IDs from 1 to 10 as shown in Fig. 6 (a). We identify each
sensor node 100 times, resulting in 1,000 identifications in
total, and obtain the node identification accuracy of 98.9%,
which is well in line with our prior investigation on the
identifiability of clock skews in Section V-B. In spite of such
a high node identification accuracy, some testing segments
are falsely classified to wrong labels, which results from
the limited coverage of the training datasets for the clock
behaviors represented by those segments. In contrast, other
sensor nodes, e.g., the labels 1 and 3, are identified with 100%
accuracy, which implies that their testing segments provide
enough information to the system so that they can be uniquely
identified based on the trained SIMO CNN model.
Fig. 10. Experimental results of centralized NISA for identifying 10 sensor
nodes each for 100 times without Spoofing attacks.
Fig. 11. Illustration of the distance between the attacker and the legitimate
sensor node in our experiments.
From the experimental results discussed above, we found
that the integrated system design of centralized NISA could
clearly identify sensor nodes thanks to its use of combined
clock features and radio information for most cases.
2) Under Spoofing Attacks: For the evaluation of the per-
formance of centralized NISA under Spoofing attacks, we add
one sensor node working as an attacker to the testbed described
in Section V-A. We deploy the attacker next to a legitimate
sensor with just 1-cm gap between the two as shown in Fig. 11
as a worst case scenario.
As in [14], [21], the attacker estimates the clock parameters
of the legitimate sensor node—node 10 with the label 9
in our case—by eavesdropping on the time synchronization
packets. The attacker then generates timestamps in its own
time synchronization packets based on the legitimate sensor
node’s clock parameters through time synchronization so that
the calculated clock skew at the head based on the received
packets from the attacker would be very close to that of
the legitimate sensor node. Fig. 12 (a) shows how close
the attacker could imitate node 10 in its clock skew, where
the attacker could very closely imitate the clock skew as
investigated in [22]. Fig. 12 (b) and (c), on the other hand,
show the radio information of RSSI and LQI of the attacker
does not very close to that of node 10 due to its spatial
correlation.
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Fig. 12. Illustrations of (a) clock feature of skew, and radio information of
(b) RSSI and (c) LQI between the attacker and the legitimate sensor node in
our attack experiments.
The results shown in Fig. 12 demonstrate that conventional
CSNI schemes may not detect the attacker solely based on the
clock skews as discussed in [22]. However, the difference in
RSSI between the attacker and node 10 enables centralized
NISA, which takes into account both clock features and
radio information during the node identification, to detect the
attacks. Note that the LQI difference is not evident as that of
RSSI, where there are many intersections; this suggests that
LQI alone is not enough for attack detection, though it could
supplement RSSI for further improvement of its performance.
The confusion matrix shown in Fig. 13 (a) summarizes
the results of 1,100 trials of detecting attacks, 100 of which
are true attacks originated by the attacker targeting at sensor
node 10 (label 9). The x- and y-axis list the predicted and true
labels where 0 and 1 indicate “no attack” and “under attack”,
respectively; when a predicted label matches a true label, we
consider it as correct detection. The lower right corner of
Fig. 13 (a) shows our detection for actual attacks, in which 99
out of 100 attacks are correctly detected (i.e., attack detection
rate of 99%). The reason for this high detection rate is the
high radio information difference between the attacker and
the legitimate sensor node, even though the attacker is located
very close to the legitimate sensor node (i.e., just 1-cm gap
between them), which could demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed system for detecting the attackers.
The confusion matrix shown in Fig. 13 (b) is for node
identification which is carried out simultaneously with the
attack detection. As discussed with Fig. 13 (a), there is one
case where the fake data segment received from the attacker
has been considered as a legitimate one due to a false attack
detection. As a consequence, one additional node identification
is done for node 10 of label 9 (i.e., 101 times in total unlike
100 times for other legitimate sensor nodes), while 99 out of
100 attacks are filtered out for node identification based on
the results from the attack detection. Compared to the results
shown in Fig. 10, we found that the effect of Spoofing attacks














Fig. 13. Experimental results of centralized NISA for simultaneous (a) attack
detection and (b) node identification for 10 sensor nodes and 1 attacker each
for 100 times.
successful attack detection.
D. Performance of Distributed NISA under Multi-Hop Scenar-
ios
For the evaluation of the performance of distributed NISA,
we change the network topology to that of the multi-hop WSN
shown in Fig. 6 (b). As in Section V-C, we also carry out the
performance evaluation without and under Spoofing attacks.
1) Without Spoofing Attacks: We evaluate the performance
of distributed NISA in the multi-hop WSN shown in Fig. 6 (b),
where the NISA system is implemented at the head and
gateway nodes, i.e., nodes 0, 1, and 2. The head node 0
and gateway nodes 1 and 2 are responsible for the node
identification and attack detection for gateway nodes 1-2,
sensor nodes 3-5, and sensor nodes 6-8, respectively.
As discussed in Section IV-A, distributed NISA drops the
packet at either case of failed node identification or attack
detection. A packet drop without the existence of attackers,
therefore, indicates failed node identification. Fig. 14 demon-
strates the evaluation results where distributed NISA could
achieve the overall node identification accuracy of 96.563%.


























Fig. 14. Experimental results of distributed NISA for identifying 8 gateway
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Fig. 15. Experimental results of distributed NISA running at gateway nodes:
Detection/identification accuracy of node 3 and node 8 with spoofing attacks
at distances of 1 cm, 5 cm, and 10 cm.
of 91.75% and that of nodes 2 and 3 are the best with the
accuracy of 100%. This performance difference may result
from the fluctuations in the radio information, which the
simple thresholding cannot handle well.
2) Under Spoofing Attacks: To evaluate the performance
of distributed NISA under Spoofing attacks, we add one
sensor node working as an attacker as in Section V-C2. To
comprehensively demonstrate the performance of distributed
NISA under Spoofing attacks, we focus on nodes 8 and 3 in the
experiments, which provide the worst and best node identifica-
tion accuracy from the experiments without Spoofing attacks.
In addition, we launch the attacks from different distances—
i.e., 1 cm, 5 cm, and 10 cm—to the legitimate sensor nodes.
Fig. 15 illustrates the combined accuracy of attack detection
and node identification—called “detection/identification accu-
racy” in the following—of distributed NISA for nodes 8 and 3
under Spoofing attacks. For node 3, the detection/identification
accuracy of above 99% is achieved for all the distances.
For node 8, on the other hand, the detection/identification
accuracy increases from 90% to above 98% as the attack
distance increases from 1 cm to 10 cm; this is because the
channel condition of the attacker differs more from that of
the legitimate sensor node as the distance between the two
increases.
VI. COMPARISON TO RELATED WORK
Changing Time Synchronization Interval: In [21], based on
their investigations on the Spoofing attack countering CSNI,
the authors observe that two main factors should be considered
in spoofing clock skew, namely the difference between two
consecutive offsets and the synchronization interval, which we
call ∆θ and SI, respectively. Changing ∆θ could puzzle the
Spoofing attacker in predicting the correct difference in the
next period; the clock skew in this circumstance, however, be-
comes unstable & fluctuating and thereby being unpredictable,
which further causes false identification. Consequently, they
shift their focus on the latter factor of SI whose value in
most time synchronization schemes (e.g., [10], [13]) is fixed.
Based on their observations that changing SI could cause
an immediate impact on the precision of attacker’s imitating
approach—i.e., wrong calculation of fake timestamps induced
by miscalculation of SI—while the effectiveness of identifi-
cation is maintained, they employ this method for defending
against Spoofing attack in CSNI. The performance is evaluated
through the experiments on a real testbed based on Taroko
motes [51], which demonstrates that the proposed method
reduces the success rate of an attack to less than 2.4%. Note
that, however, this method requires frequent changing of SI;
it is in fact changed every 7 rounds of synchronizations in
their underlying time synchronization scheme. This changing
period method requires an empirical value that demanding
experiments in advance for its acquisition. In addition, it has
certain assumptions on the clock skew calculation capability
of the attacker, e.g., the attacker could not resume its accuracy
in estimating the clock skew in certain synchronization rounds.
Note that, unlike NISA, this method requires changes in
existing synchronization schemes on the resource-constrained
sensor nodes.
RSS Distribution (RSSD)-Based Fingerprinting: In [22],
the authors experimentally demonstrate the vulnerability of
CSNI to the Spoofing attack and, as a result, change the
base of node identification from clock skews to spatially-
correlated RSSs instead of reinforcing CSNI itself as in [21].
Specifically, a set of RSSs measured at a sensor node for its
neighboring nodes becomes a fingerprint for the sensor node.
Note that, employing RSS for detecting the Spoofing attack
is not new in the literature; for instance, the effectiveness
of detecting and localizing the Spoofing attackers has been
systematically investigated in [28], [29]. Therefore, the RSSD-
based fingerprinting proposed in [22] could identify sensor
nodes based on their RSS fingerprints while defending the
Spoofing attack.
Note that RSSD-based fingerprinting is different from NISA
in that its node identification is solely based on radio infor-
mation: In NISA, on the other hand, the radio information is
used only for detecting the Spoofing attack. Due to the random
fluctuation of a signal, the noise from multi-path effects, and
the device dependency in RSS measurements [52], the RSSD-
based fingerprinting has an innate limit in its identifiability
compared to CSNI. The use of radio information in NISA,
on the other hand, is dedicated for attack detection, which
is binary classification and, therefore, does not require fine-
grained identifiability. As we discussed in Section I, the use
of RSS for node identification would make the RSSD-based




In this paper, we have proposed a new CSNI framework
called NISA where node identification is protected from
Spoofing attacks based on spatially-correlated radio informa-
tion. We have also provided two variations of NISA sys-
tem implementation—called centralized NISA and distributed
NISA, respectively—to cover both single- and multi-hop sce-
narios.
In distributed NISA, node identification and attack detection
are done independently with a dedicated algorithm for each,
which could significantly lower the implementation complex-
ity and, thereby, enables distributed NISA to be implemented
and run at gateway nodes (i.e., cluster heads) as well as the
head. Centralized NISA, on the other hand, could provide
higher performance through its integrated processing of node
identification and attack detection using a common algorithm
for both based on the time-series of combined clock features
and radio information. This synergy of the two processes that
are separately handled in distributed NISA, however, comes
at the expense of the higher implementation complexity and
would limit its application to single-hop scenarios, i.e., running
only at the head.
To investigate the identifiability of clock skews under
various working conditions and the performance/complexity
tradeoff between centralized and distributed NISA in single-
hop and multi-hop WSNs, we have carried out a series of
experiments on a real WSN testbed consisting of 11 TelosB
motes running TinyOS. The experimental results demonstrate
the identifiability of clock skews and their concurrent be-
haviors under temperature and voltage variations, which are
enabled by the high-precision clock parameter estimation of
BATS. We could also observe from the experimental results
that the feasibility and effectiveness of node identification and
Spoofing attack detection of centralized and distributed NISA
are proper for single-hop and multi-hop scenarios, respectively.
Although we have provided the initial design, implemen-
tation, and performance evaluation of both centralized and
distributed NISA in this paper, there is still room for further
improvements: Centralized NISA has the potential to use not
only other neural network architectures like RNN (including
its variations of LSTM and GRU) and hybrid of CNN and
RNN but also conventional machine learning algorithms such
as random forest, which could have different performance
and computational complexity; distributed NISA, on the other
hand, could be improved by adopting more advanced thresh-
olding and parameter fusion techniques.
APPENDIX
PSEUDOCODE FOR PROCEDURES OF CENTRALIZED NISA
AT THE HEAD NODE
Algorithm 1 shows pseudocode for the procedures of cen-
tralized NISA running at the head node.
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Data: The head node maintains the following data and
variables:
• e: Event object;
• p: Packet object;
• T2: MAC-layer Timestamp;
• RSSI: RSSI value;
• LQI: LQI value;
• QP: FIFO queue for packets;
• QT2: FIFO queue for timestamp T2.
1 On detecting an event e:
2 switch e.type do
3 case PACKET do
4 if p.getDestAddress()==HE AD then
5 p← QP .dequeue()
6 T2← QT2.dequeue()
7 RSSI ← getRSSI(p)
8 LQI ← getLQI(p)
9 p← Packet(p,T2, RSSI, LQI)
10 send(p) // forward the packet to
monitoring station
11 else
// Packets not for the head . . .
12 otherwise do
// Process other events . . .
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for the procedures of central-
ized NISA at the head node.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Zanella, N. Bui, A. Castellani, L. Vangelista, and M. Zorzi, “Internet
of things for smart cities,” IEEE Internet Things J., vol. 1, no. 1, pp.
22–32, Feb. 2014.
[2] Y. Zou, J. Zhu, X. Wang, and L. Hanzo, “A survey on wireless security:
Technical challenges, recent advances, and future trends,” Proc. IEEE,
vol. 104, no. 9, pp. 1727–1765, Sep. 2016.
[3] L. Xiao, G. Sheng, X. Wan, W. Su, and P. Cheng, “Learning-based phy-
layer authentication for underwater sensor networks,” IEEE Commun.
Lett., vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 60–63, Jan. 2019.
[4] Q. Xu, R. Zheng, W. Saad, and Z. Han, “Device fingerprinting in wire-
less networks: Challenges and opportunities,” IEEE Commun. Surveys
Tuts., vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 94–104, First Quarter 2016.
[5] S. Jana and S. K. Kasera, “On fast and accurate detection of unauthorized
wireless access points using clock skews,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput.,
vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 449–462, Mar. 2010.
[6] T. Kohno, A. Broido, and K. C. Claffy, “Remote physical device
fingerprinting,” IEEE Trans. Dependable Secure Comput., vol. 2, no. 2,
pp. 93–108, Apr. 2005.
[7] S. U. Sagong, X. Ying, A. Clark, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran,
“Cloaking the clock: Emulating clock skew in controller area networks,”
in Proc. ICCPS’18, Apr. 2018, pp. 32–42.
[8] J. Yu, A. Hu, G. Li, and L. Peng, “A robust RF fingerprinting
approach using multisampling convolutional neural network,” IEEE
Internet Things J., vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 6786–6799, Aug. 2019.
[9] J.-P. Sheu, W.-K. Hu, and J.-C. Lin, “Ratio-based time synchronization
protocol in wireless sensor networks,” Telecommunication Systems,
vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 25–35, Sep. 2008.
[10] X. Huan, K. S. Kim, S. Lee, E. G. Lim, and A. Marshall, “A beaconless
asymmetric energy-efficient time synchronization scheme for resource-
constrained multi-hop wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Trans. Commun.,
vol. 68, no. 3, pp. 1716–1730, Mar. 2020.
[11] D. Huang, W. Teng, C. Wang, H. Huang, and J. M. Hellerstein, “Clock
skew based node identification in wireless sensor networks,” in Proc.
2008 IEEE GLOBECOM, Nov. 2008, pp. 1–5.
12
[12] S. V. Radhakrishnan, A. S. Uluagac, and R. Beyah, “GTID: A tech-
nique for physical device and device type fingerprinting,” IEEE Trans.
Dependable Secure Comput., vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 519–532, Sep. 2015.
[13] M. Maróti, B. Kusy, G. Simon, and Ákos Lédeczi, “The flooding time
synchronization protocol,” in Proc. SenSys’04, Baltimore, MD, USA,
Nov. 2004, pp. 39–49.
[14] M. B. Uddin and C. Castelluccia, “Toward clock skew based wireless
sensor node services,” in Proc. WICON 2010, Singapore, Mar. 2010, pp.
1–9.
[15] MicaZ datasheet. Accessed: 2021-02-01. [Online]. Available: http:
//courses.ece.ubc.ca/494/files/MICAz_Datasheet.pdf
[16] TelosB datasheet. Accessed: 2021-02-01. [Online]. Available: http:
//www2.ece.ohio-state.edu/~bibyk/ee582/telosMote.pdf
[17] J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song, and A. Perrig, “The sybil attack in sensor
networks: analysis & defenses,” in Proc. IPSN’04, Berkeley, CA, USA,
Apr. 2004, pp. 259–268.
[18] H. Fu, S. Kawamura, M. Zhang, and L. Zhang, “Replication attack on
random key pre-distribution schemes for wireless sensor networks,” in
Proc. IAW 2005, West Point, NY, USA, Jun. 2005, pp. 134–141.
[19] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. Johnson, “Wormhole attacks in wireless
networks,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 370–380,
Feb. 2006.
[20] R. Maheshwari, J. Gao, and S. R. Das, “Detecting wormhole attacks in
wireless networks using connectivity information,” in Proc. 2007 IEEE
INFOCOM, Anchorage, AK, USA, May 2007, pp. 107–115.
[21] D. Huang and W. Teng, “A defense against clock skew replication
attacks in wireless sensor networks,” Journal of Network and Computer
Applications, vol. 39, pp. 26–37, Mar. 2014.
[22] X. Mei, D. Liu, K. Sun, and D. Xu, “On feasibility of fingerprinting
wireless sensor nodes using physical properties,” in Proc. IPDPS 2013,
Boston, MA, USA, May 2013, pp. 1112–1121.
[23] X. Huan and K. S. Kim, “On the practical implementation of propagation
delay and clock skew compensated high-precision time synchronization
schemes with resource-constrained sensor nodes in multi-hop wireless
sensor networks,” Computer Networks, vol. 166, p. 106959, Jan. 2020.
[24] K. S. Kim, S. Lee, and E. G. Lim, “Energy-efficient time synchronization
based on asynchronous source clock frequency recovery and reverse
two-way message exchanges in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Trans.
Commun., vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 347–359, Jan. 2017.
[25] A. Achroufene, Y. Amirat, and A. Chibani, “RSS-based indoor localiza-
tion using belief function theory,” IEEE Trans. Autom. Sci. Eng., vol. 16,
no. 3, pp. 1163–1180, Jul. 2019.
[26] S. Tomic, M. Beko, and R. Dinis, “RSS-based localization in wireless
sensor networks using convex relaxation: Noncooperative and coopera-
tive schemes,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., vol. 64, no. 5, pp. 2037–2050,
May 2015.
[27] J. Zhang, T. Q. Duong, A. Marshall, and R. Woods, “Key generation
from wireless channels: A review,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 614–626,
Jan. 2016.
[28] Y. Chen, J. Yang, W. Trappe, and R. P. Martin, “Detecting and localizing
identity-based attacks in wireless and sensor networks,” IEEE Trans.
Veh. Technol., vol. 59, no. 5, pp. 2418–2434, Jun. 2010.
[29] J. Yang, Y. Chen, W. Trappe, and J. Cheng, “Detection and localization
of multiple spoofing attackers in wireless networks,” IEEE Trans.
Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 44–58, Jan. 2013.
[30] D. A. Knox and T. Kunz, “Wireless fingerprints inside a wireless sensor
network,” ACM Trans. Sen. Netw., vol. 11, no. 2, Mar. 2015.
[31] B. W. Ramsey, B. E. Mullins, M. A. Temple, and M. R. Grimaila,
“Wireless intrusion detection and device fingerprinting through preamble
manipulation,” IEEE Trans. Dependable Secure Comput., vol. 12, no. 5,
pp. 585–596, Sep. 2015.
[32] M. Jin, T. Xing, X. Chen, X. Meng, D. Fang, and Y. He, “Dualsync:
Taming clock skew variation for synchronization in low-power wireless
networks,” in Proc. 2016 IEEE INFOCOM, San Francisco, CA, USA,
Apr. 2016, pp. 1–9.
[33] Z. Yang, L. He, L. Cai, and J. Pan, “Temperature-assisted clock
synchronization and self-calibration for sensor networks,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 13, no. 6, pp. 3419–3429, Jun. 2014.
[34] TinyOS. Accessed: 2019-12-16. [Online]. Available: https://github.com/
tinyos/tinyos-main
[35] N. M. Freris, S. R. Graham, and P. R. Kumar, “Fundamental limits on
synchronizing clocks over networks,” Proc. IEEE, vol. 56, no. 6, pp.
1352–1364, Jun. 2011.
[36] X. Huan and K. S. Kim, “Per-hop delay compensation in time synchro-
nization for multi-hop wireless sensor networks based on packet-relaying
gateways,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 24, no. 10, pp. 2300–2304, Oct.
2020.
[37] IEEE Computer Society, IEEE Std 754TM-2008, IEEE Standard for
floating-point arithmetic, Std., 2008.
[38] H. Liu, J. Yang, Y. Wang, Y. Chen, and C. E. Koksal, “Group secret
key generation via received signal strength: Protocols, achievable rates,
and implementation,” IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput., vol. 13, no. 12, pp.
2820–2835, Dec. 2014.
[39] N. Baccour, A. Koubâa, L. Mottola, M. A. Zúñiga, H. Youssef, C. A.
Boano, and M. Alves, “Radio link quality estimation in wireless sensor
networks: A survey,” ACM Trans. Sen. Netw., vol. 8, no. 4, Sep. 2012.
[40] N. Kuruwatti, Y. N. Nayana, N. Sarole, G. Revadigar, and C. Javali,
“LQI-Key: Symmetric key generation scheme for Internet-of-Things
(IoT) devices using wireless channel link quality,” in Proc. ICAECC
2018, Feb. 2018, pp. 1–6.
[41] W. Liu, Y. Xia, R. Luo, and S. Hu, “Lightweight, fluctuation insensi-
tive multi-parameter fusion link quality estimation for wireless sensor
networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 28 496–28 511, Feb. 2020.
[42] K. Sankhe, M. Belgiovine, F. Zhou, L. Angioloni, F. Restuccia,
S. D’Oro, T. Melodia, S. Ioannidis, and K. Chowdhury, “No radio left
behind: Radio fingerprinting through deep learning of physical-layer
hardware impairments,” IEEE Trans. Cogn. Commun. Netw., vol. 6,
no. 1, pp. 165–178, Mar. 2020.
[43] B. Zhao, H. Lu, S. Chen, J. Liu, and D. Wu, “Convolutional neural
networks for time series classification,” J. Syst. Eng. Electron., vol. 28,
no. 1, pp. 162–169, Feb. 2017.
[44] C. Liu, W. Hsaio, and Y. Tu, “Time series classification with multivariate
convolutional neural network,” IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron, vol. 66, no. 6,
pp. 4788–4797, Jun. 2019.
[45] D. Kingma and J. Ba, “ADAM: A method for stochastic optimization,”
ArXiv e-prints, Jan. 2017.
[46] F. Chollet et al., “Keras,” https://keras.io, 2015.
[47] TensorFlowTM. Accessed: 2021-02-01. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.tensorflow.org/
[48] T. M. Cover and P. E. Hart, “Nearest neighbor pattern classification,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 21–27, Jan. 1967.
[49] S. Fu, M. Ceriotti, Y. Jiang, C. Shih, X. Huan, and P. J. Marron, “An
approach to detect anomalous degradation in signal strength of IEEE
802.15.4 links,” in Proc. IEEE SECON 2018, Jun. 2018, pp. 1–9.
[50] G. Cena, S. Scanzio, and A. Valenzano, “A neural network clock
discipline algorithm for the RBIS clock synchronization protocol,” in
Proc. WFCS 2018, Imperia, Italy, Jun. 2018, pp. 1–10.
[51] S.-Y. Lau, T.-H. Chang, S.-Y. Hu, H.-J. Huang, L. de Shyu, C.-M.
Chiu, and P. Huang, “Sensor networks for everyday use: The BL-Live
experience,” in Proc. SUTC’06, vol. 1, Taichung, Taiwan, Jun. 2006, pp.
1–7.
[52] K. S. Kim, R. Wang, Z. Zhong, Z. Tan, H. Song, J. Cha, and
S. Lee, “Large-scale location-aware services in access: Hierarchical
building/floor classification and location estimation using Wi-Fi finger-
printing based on deep neural networks,” Fiber and Integrated Optics,
vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 277–289, Apr. 2018.
Xintao Huan (S’00) received the B.Sc. and M.Sc.
degrees in computer engineering from the University
of Duisburg-Essen, Germany, in 2013 and 2017, re-
spectively. He is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree
with the Department of Electrical Engineering and
Electronics, University of Liverpool, UK, and the
Department of Communications and Networking,
Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, China. He was
a Research Assistant with the Networked Embedded
Systems Group, University of Duisburg-Essen, from
2012 to 2016. His research interests include wireless
sensor networks and Internet of Things.
13
Kyeong Soo Kim (S’89-M’97-SM’19) received PhD
degree in Electronics Engineering from Seoul Na-
tional University, Korea, in 1995, and has been
working as an associate professor at the Depart-
ment of Communications and Networking, Xi’an
Jiaotong-Liverpool University, China, since 2014.
From 1996 to 1997, he was engaged in the develop-
ment of multi-channel asynchronous transfer mode
(ATM) switching systems as a Post-Doc researcher
at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.
From 1997 to 2000, he worked with the passive
optical network (PON) Systems R&D organization of Lucent Technologies
and was involved with development of ATM-PON systems, which won
1999 Bell Labs President’s Silver Award. From 2001 to 2007, he was with
STMicroelectronics, working as a Principal Engineer; during this period, he
also took the position of STMicroelectronics Researcher-in-Residence at the
Stanford Networking Research Center. From 2007 to 2014, he worked at
Swansea University, U.K., as an associate professor. Dr. Kim is a senior
member of IEEE and a member of IET.
Junqing Zhang received the B.Eng and M.Eng
degrees in Electrical Engineering from Tianjin Uni-
versity, China in 2009 and 2012, respectively, and
the Ph.D degree in Electronics and Electrical En-
gineering from Queen’s University Belfast, UK in
2016. From Feb. 2016 to Jan. 2018, he was a Post-
doctoral Research Fellow with Queen’s University
Belfast. From Feb. 2018 to May 2020, he was
a Tenure Track Fellow (Assistant Professor) with
University of Liverpool, UK. Since June 2020, he is
a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) with University of
Liverpool. His research interests include Internet of Things, wireless security,
physical layer security, key generation, and radio frequency fingerprinting
identification.
